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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The reason for requiring that all steps be taken was that Congress wanted to do
away with "litigious interruption in the process of selection." Falbo v. United
States, supra.
The Falbo case was followed by a long line of decisions dealing with the
problem of what constituted the required final step. In Estep v. United States,
supra, where the registrant had exhausted his administrative appeals and appeared
at the induction center but refused to be inducted, he was considered to have taken
the final step. Billings v. Truesdell, 321 U. S. 542 (1944), required the defendant
to do everything except take the oath. Gibson v. United States, 329 U. S. 338
(1946), cited by the dissent for the proposition that one does not have to obey
an order for induction to be entitled to question the draft board's denial of
exemption from military service, is not inconsistent with the preceding cases. The
Selective Regulations in effect at that time did not provide for a physical examination upon reporting to work camp, so that the final step was a pre-induction
physical examination. In each case resort must be had to the Regulations in effect
at the time to determine the final step. Contra:Ex Parte Fabiani,105 F. Supp. 139
(3rd Cir. 1952).
The minority in the instant case would have required the local draft board to
fill out defendant's form on the basis of facts contained in his letters. They cited a
regulation which provides, " . . . The local board will receive and consider all
information . . . presented to it." 32 C. F. R. § 1622-1(c) (Rev. 1951).
There are no other cases interpreting this regulation in this way.
As harsh as the result may seem, the Selective Service Regulations provide
for a physical examination at the induction center, where the registrant may still
be rejected, S. R. 615-180-1 § 35(a) April 1953). Palmer would probably
have received a complete physical examination, not having taken one before
classification, and thus had a good chance of being rejected. Had he reported for
induction and examination, he would probably have been allowed to plead his
classification regardless of not having exhausted his intermediate appeals; the
dissent seems correct in asserting that the induction order obviated the necessity
for taking the intermediate administrative appeals.
Tamara S. Pasichniak
Slander of Title
Plaintiff claimed that defendant had disparaged her title by maliciously
recording a notice of pendency of an action, when defendant knew that he had no
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right to any relief. In an appeal from a dismissal on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, held (4-3): Complaint states a cause of action;
lis pendens is not a declaration in the course of a judicial proceeding, and therefore
is not absolutely privileged by section 47 (2) of the California Civil Code.
Albertson v. Roboff, Cal.
, 287 P. 2d 145 (1955).
Although an action for slander of title differs from that of personal defamation, substantially the same absolute privilege is recognized in relation to both
torts. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 587, 638 (1937). Section 47 (2) of the California Civil Code codifies the common law rule that defamatory statements, made
in the course of a judicial proceeding, are absolutely privileged. Gosewisch v.
Doran, 161 Cal. 511, 119 P. 656 (1911).
A slander of title will generally occur where one maliciously seeks to disparage
another's interest to property, to make it unmerchantable, by recording an instrument whereby the maligner purports to have some interest in the property. For
example, the making and recording of a deed, Chesebro v. Powers, 78 Mich. 472,
44 N. W. 290 (1889); recording a false contract of sale, Lehman v. Goldin, 160
Fla. 710, 36 So 2d 259 (1948); recording an abstract of judgment, Coley v.
Hecker, 206 Cal. 22, 272 P. 1045 (1928).
The majority relied, to a great extent, on a very strong dictum in West
Investment Co. v. Moorhead, 120 Cal. App. 837, 262 P. 2d 322 (1953) in which
a slander of title action was based upon the malicious recording of a notice of
lis pendens in a prior action. There the court, in interpreting section 47(2),
reasoned that the publication in a notice of lis pendens was not absolutely privileged, because the recording was outside the purview of the court and was "merely
a private act undertaken dehors the judicial proceeding."
Therefore in the instant case the court held a permissive recording-the
court did not decide about a mandatory recording-is not absolutely privileged
because the court has no control over the publication. It would seem that for a
publication to be absolutely privileged, it must be an integral part of the proceeding, and the court must have some semblance of control over the publication.
The minority, however, contended that all publications which have some
relation to the proceeding and are reasonably necessary to further the proceeding
as a whole should be absolutely privileged. RESTATEMENT, TORTS, §587, comment
i (1938>; Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214, 47 N. E. 265 (1897). The dissenters also argued that the majority decision would place members of the bar in
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jeopardy; that in attempting to protect a client's interests by recording a notice
of pendency, the attorney runs the risk of personal liability in an action for
slander of title.
There seems to be no controlling authority in New York. A notice of
pendency may be filed where the action affects the title to, or the possession, use
or enjoyment of, real property. N. Y. Cirv. PRAc. ACT §§ 120-125. In Smith v.
Smith, 26 Hun. 573 (1880), an action on the case for abuse of the civil process
by defendant's filing a notice of pendency, there is a dictum that such a filing is
privileged; but in Schierloh v. Kelly, 253 App. Div. 373, 2 N. Y. S. 2d 188
(2d Dep't, 1938), the court refused to dismiss a complaint where the basis of
the action was the malicious filing of lis pendens, although the question of
privilege was not considered. The absolute privilege was granted to the printer
of a defamatory list of questions which counsel prepared for trial, Youmans v.
Smith, supra, while the court refused to extend such a privilege to the writer of a
complaint to the District Attorney, Pecua v. West, 233 N. Y. 316, 135 N. E. 515
(1922). The Law Revision Commission has recently recommended that the
legislature require parties filing a lis pendens to post a bond. N. Y. LAW REV.
COMm. 203-226 (1951). It is uncertain, then, whether the filing of lis pendens
in New York would be in the course of a judicial proceeding and therefore
absolutely privileged.
The absolute privilege is granted to insure the utmost freedom of expression
during litigation, and to afford access to the courts without fear of personal
liability in a defemation suit. RESTAiEMENT, TORTS § 587, comment a (1938).
The court's supervisory and contempt powers are felt to be an adequate check to
potential abuses. Maginn v. Schmick, 127 Mo. App. 411, 105 S. W. 666 (1907).
In view of this purpose, the decision in the instant case appears to be sound.
The recorder of lis pendens is able to publish the object of his action in a place
of public access, while the courts have little, if any, control over such publication.
The parties recording such a notice are protected if this act is in good faith and
without malice, and any risk of personal liability is outweighed by the necessity
of preserving the enjoyment of property interests in the face of malicious claims.
Richard F. Griffin
Taxations: Marital Deduction foo Life Estates
Under the terms of her husband's will ,the surviving spouse was given a life
estate with uncontrolled discretion to use, enjoy, sell or dispose of the income and
principal but with no power over the disposition of any part remaining at her

